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  The grain/oilseed industry is undergoing considerable structural change through mergers and 
new value-added businesses, which raises price-related questions. We analyze the level of 
price integration prior to and following a merger between two grain firms and the start-up of a 
producer-owned ethanol facility. This research utilizes error correction vector autoregression 
analysis to compute market integration structural change effects. We find evidence that market 
integration initially increases with the merger, but deteriorates with time following the merger. 
We find no significant localized change in the level of price integration for the case of a new 
value-added business. 
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The grain/oilseed industry is undergoing consid-
erable structural change, including consolidation 
and new processing facilities to add value beyond 
commodity grade. Such rapid structural changes 
present difficulties in precisely modeling and 
forecasting price relationships. Furthermore, past 
research may no longer be relevant in post-struc-
tural change environments. Two lines of thought 
exist regarding structural change. First, industry 
consolidation may provide market power to ac-
quiring firms (Goodwin 1992a, and Parcell, 
Mintert, and Plain 2004), and the economic im-
pact of applying market power (e.g., collusion) 
may be significant (Connor 1997). Firms with 
market power are perceived to affect price levels, 
manipulating prices relative to other locations and 
reducing market efficiency. Second, consolida-
tion and/or the development of new businesses 
may improve market efficiency through reduced 
transaction costs and increased competition, re-
spectively (Goodwin and Schroeder 1991). For 
the current analysis, we do not directly address 
the issue of price-level changes. We focus on 
market price integration, in which deviations 
from historical levels might signal a change in 
pricing behavior. In light of the above described 
trade-offs (reduced transaction cost, but poten-
tially asymmetric information), we postulate no a 
priori expectation regarding the impact of a 
merger on the level of price integration. Simi-
larly, no a priori expectation is held for the im-
pact of a new business. Increased competition 
generally favors market efficiency. However, the 
introduction of a new business may weaken ex-
isting price linkages if the surrounding firms al-
ready approximate perfect competition (Faminow 
and Benson 1990). 
  Selecting two structural change events in north-
east Missouri as case studies, we provide an inci-
sive glimpse at the larger impact of structural 
change in the grain/oilseed industry. We investi-
gate the impact of structural change on spatial 
price relationships, i.e., market integration effects, 
prior to and following the 1998 merger of Archer 
Daniels Midland (ADM) and the Quincy Soybean 
Company, and the opening of a producer-owned 
ethanol plant in Macon, Missouri, in 2000. While 
these are local events, they are representative of 
the two most likely structural change events to 
occur in the grain/oilseed industry today. 
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  ADM and the Quincy Soybean Company oper-
ated competing elevators in northeast Missouri. 
After they merged in January 1998, ADM owned 
many of the elevators in the region. The acquisi-
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tion included Quincy Soybean Company’s 22 
elevators and two terminals on the Mississippi 
River at Quincy, Illinois, and Helena, Arkansas, 
and made ADM the clear leader in U.S. soybean 
trade, with 33 percent of the crush capacity and 
30 percent of the vegetable oil refining volume 
(Smith 1998). 
 The Northeast Missouri Grain Processors 
(NEMO) cooperative created a value-added mar-
ket for its producer-owners when it began pur-
chasing corn for its ethanol plant on May 1, 2000. 
This facility produced nearly 15 million gallons 
of ethanol, using over 5 million bushels of corn 
annually. This structural change provided a new 
source of corn demand in northeast Missouri. The 
NEMO producer-owners are located primarily 
within a 70-mile radius of the ethanol plant, and 
over 70 percent of the corn is sourced in state. 
  Structural changes such as these raise questions 
regarding to what extent, if any, the entrance and 
exit of competitors, i.e., the number of buyers in a 
given region, and the structure and ownership 
characteristics of these firms impact pricing pat-
terns and linkages. This research determines if the 
degree of price integration in the grain/oilseed 
industry changed in correspondence to the two 
identified structural change events. Our analysis 
differs from previous analyses by the scope of the 
study. We investigate two localized structural 
changes, whereas previous research has focused 
on regional or national structural changes. 
 
Literature Review 
Numerous producers (sellers) and relatively fewer 
buyers dispersed over geographic regions are 
general characteristics of agricultural markets 
(Faminow and Benson 1990). Given the structure 
of agricultural markets, the process of price dis-
covery is often influenced by the spatial and in-
tertemporal aspects of the markets. Market com-
petition and efficiency varies with these spatial 
and intertemporal influences. Thus, the study of 
the interdependence of markets, as measured by 
price relationships, is important. 
  Faminow and Benson (1990) noted that studies 
of spatial price relationships for agricultural com-
modities have been widely used to indicate 
market performance, without consideration of in-
traregional transportation costs. In an analysis of 
short- and long-run integration among Canadian 
hog markets, the authors found possible market 
inefficiencies, which they attributed to substantial 
institutional change in the industry.
1
  Bedrossian and Moschos (1988) identified a 
negative industry profitability effect on the rela-
tionship between concentration and speed of price 
adjustment, since lower industry profit margins 
incite higher speed of price adjustments. The op-
posing positive leadership effect, associated with 
higher relative profitability of industry leaders, 
was shown to be the exception by quarterly price 
analysis of 20 Greek manufacturing industries, 
suggesting that both concentration and the length 
of the production period had negative effects on 
the speed of price adjustments. 
  Goodwin (1992a) noted that standard forecast-
ing models that ignore structural change might 
produce biased and misleading forecasts. The 
author’s vector autoregression (VAR) models and 
impulse response functions confirmed the exis-
tence of a gradual structural change in U.S. cattle 
markets from 1974 through the early 1980s, and 
indicated greater exogeneity and faster adjust-
ment of prices since the structural change. 
  Goodwin and Schroeder (1991) found that in-
creased cointegration in several regional fed cattle 
markets paralleled significant structural changes 
to the livestock industry in the 1980s.
2 The au-
thors suggested that increased market concentra-
tion may have decreased trade and information 
costs or, alternatively, that packers may have co-
ordinated price behavior across regions. 
  Schroeder (1997) evaluated fed cattle spatial 
price relationships. Using error correction VAR 
models, he estimated the level of price causality 
between market locations. Furthermore, he 
regressed market factors on the error correction 
(speed-of-adjustment) coefficient generated from 
separate market integration equations. He found 
an increase in the speed-of-adjustment term to be 
associated with plants in close proximity to each 
other, and a decrease in the speed-of-adjustment 
term for larger plants and plants having fewer 
cash transactions. 
  Goodwin and Piggott (2001) utilized VAR mod-
els to test for the significance of “neutral bands” 
 
1 Markets perform efficiently when they are integrated (i.e., when the 
price in the importing market equals the price in the exporting market 
plus the transportation and other transfer costs associated with trade). 
2 When a long-term equilibrium exists between price series, they are 
cointegrated. Highly cointegrated markets imply strong spatial price 
linkages.  
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in accounting for transaction costs in an analysis 
of price linkages among four corn and soybean 
markets in North Carolina (p. 302). The signifi-
cance of transaction costs on spatial price link-
ages was confirmed, as threshold models consis-
tently suggested faster adjustments in response to 
deviations from equilibrium than when threshold 
behavior is ignored. Overall, the results were con-
sistent with long-run market integration. 
  Thompson, Sul, and Bohl (2002) tested for the 
Law of One Price (LOP) in French, German, and 
British wheat markets, and considered the effects 
of European Union policy reform when assessing 
short-run price adjustment dynamics. Employing 
various augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and 
error correction methods, the authors rendered 
their results “strong evidence for LOP in the long 
run” (p. 1051). 
 
Theoretical Model 
We adopt a model used extensively in the spatial 
literature in which commodity producers are as-
sumed to be evenly and continuously distributed 
over some arbitrary space (Mulligan and Fik 
1989, Faminow and Benson 1990, and Schrimper 
2001). Faminow and Benson (1990) provide de-
tailed derivations of oligopolistic competition 
among spatially dispersed firms, which may be 
adapted to cases of oligopsonistic competition. 
Following Faminow and Benson (1990), an in-
verse demand function for the commodity at each 
buying point (i.e., elevator) is given by 
 
(1)  (/)
v Pab v q =− , 
 
where  P  is the delivered price, q is the quantity 
demanded, a and b are positive constants, and v is 
a constant parameter, v > -1.
3 The price received 
by producers consists of the commodity’s value, 
p, at some location, minus transportation costs, u. 
Thus, the price producers receive by delivering to 
a particular elevator is specified as 
 
(2)  Pp u =−. 
 
Combining (1) and (2) and solving for q yields 
                                                                                    
3 As a constant marginal cost is assumed, v must be greater than -1, 
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The costs of transporting a commodity to geo-
graphically separated i = 1, …, n elevators are not 
necessarily identical. 
  The effect of transportation costs on prices re-
ceived may be diagramed using producer price 
surfaces, as outlined by Schrimper (2001). Figure 
1 depicts the two-firm case (i.e., i = x, y), where 
price is measured vertically and distance horizon-
tally. The heights of the bars emanating out of the 
horizontal axis reflect differences in the value, or 
the marginal cost to the seller, of the commodity 
at locations X and Y. Hence, Py (the price offered 
by elevator y) is greater than Px (the price offered 
by elevator x) in this depiction. This price differ-
ence may be due to location, convenience yield, 
or operational cost differences. The slopes of the 
linear lines, called price surfaces, represent how 
the value of the commodity diminishes with dis-
tance due to transportation costs (steeper slopes 
implying higher transportation costs).
4 Elevators 
compete only at the periphery of their market 
areas, represented in Figure 1 by the point on the 
horizontal axis corresponding to the dashed line.
5 
The boundary between the two elevators’ market 










Figure 1. Duopsonistic Spatial Competition 
Under FOB Pricing 
                                                                                    
4 Price surfaces can be made more complicated by considering that 
the relationship between transportation costs and distance may be 
nonlinear (due to multiple modes of transportation), but the purpose of 
our exposition is simple illustration. 
5 The market periphery area is not constant due to local supply and 
demand factors. For example, during certain times of the year it is not 
uncommon for a north-central Missouri large hog producer, Premium 
Standard Farms, to source corn from north-central Iowa. 
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price surfaces where delivered prices are equal, 
and producers are indifferent between delivering 
to one elevator or the other. The price set by ele-
vator  i is impacted by transportation costs and 
demand conditions faced by elevators j,...,n ≠ i, 
so that if Pi decreases, then the other firms re-
spond by decreasing their respective prices. Thus, 
elevators x and y are (by the definition of geo-
graphic market integration used here) in the same 
market, as illustrated by the interdependence of 
relative prices. Faminow and Benson (1990) sub-
mit that neither prices net of transportation costs 
between locations nor the magnitude of a price 
response by one elevator to a change in the price 
offered by another need to be identical. Indeed, 
arbitrage guarantees only that prices at different 
locations will not differ by more than transporta-
tion costs. 
  The theoretical example of oligopsonistic com-
petition among relatively few buyers for the pro-
duction of numerous sellers is illustrated by add-
ing a firm at location Z (Figure 2). Pz may be in-
terpreted as the corn price offered by a start-up 
corn ethanol plant that values the commodity 
somewhat more than its neighboring elevator 
(point  X), but somewhat less than, say, a river 
terminal (point Y). Placing the ethanol plant be-
tween the two pre-existing elevators creates new 
market boundaries represented by the dashed 
lines. Faminow and Benson (1990) suggest that 
as the number of intermediate buying sites be-
tween existing buyers increases, price linkages 
between the original locations weaken.
6 Further-
more, a distance-decay effect causes price re-
sponses to be weaker among more distantly lo-
cated and indirectly linked competitors (Mulligan 
and Fik 1989).
7
  Suppose that one firm owns elevators at loca-
tions V and Z, while another firm owns elevators 
at locations W and Y, and still another firm owns 
elevators at locations U and X. Corresponding to 
the six locations, Figure 3 illustrates five market 
boundaries by dashed lines. Now suppose that a 
 
6 According to price surface theory, markets that are indirectly linked 
(e.g., X and Y in Figure 2) by an intermediate market (e.g., Z) may be 
less integrated than directly linked markets (e.g., X and Y in Figure 1). 
7 Distance decay—the deterioration of interlocational price relation-
ships with increasing geographic space—is due to the greater costs and 
risks associated with trading between more distant markets. Generally, 
the greater the distance (hence, the greater the associated costs and 












Figure 2. Oligopsonistic Spatial Competition 











Figure 3. Oligopsonistic Spatial Competition 
Under FOB Pricing, a Merger 
 
merger occurs such that locations V, W, Y, and Z 
fall under the control of a single firm. The effect 
of a merger on price linkages is not evident from 
this type of diagram, since the number of market 
boundaries decreases only if some locations are 
shut down. Price linkages between locations V, 
W, Y, and Z may become stronger if information 
is better communicated within one firm than 
across multiple firms. Though, in general, short-
run price rigidities are prolonged in sectors with 
high industrial concentration and longer produc-
tion processes, the effect of increasing concentra-
tion on the speed of price adjustments may be 
positive in a concentrated industry dominated by 
a relatively more profitable price-leader or a col-




An extensive literature has employed time-series 
procedures appropriate for analyses of market 
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  The Law of One Price (LOP) holds when prices 
at paired locations are cointegrated, i.e., when a 
long-run equilibrium relationship exists between 
prices at paired locations (Goodwin 1992b). 
Cointegration necessitates that each of the time 
series be integrated of the same order (Gujarati 
1995). Given that each time series was found to 
be I(1), the Johansen method (Enders 1995) was 
employed prior to and following the structural 
change events to investigate the LOP between 
Kansas City, Macon, Hannibal, and St. Louis, 
Missouri, corn and soybean prices. 
 Prior to the market integration analysis, 
Dickey-Fuller (DF) tests of stationarity were per-
formed on both the soybean and corn price series. 
In all cases, the null hypothesis of nonstationarity 
could not be rejected at a 10 percent confidence 
level, as the absolute values of the DF test statis-
tics were between zero and the DF absolute criti-
cal value of 2.57. Thus, the price series were 
deemed nonstationary. Nonstationarity was cor-
rected for by first-differencing the data. DF tests 
verified that the time series were integrated of 
order 1, denoted I(1), meaning that differencing 
the nonstationary time series once yielded sta-
tionary, or I(0), time series. 
  Our analysis utilized daily corn and soybean 
price data spanning January 1996 through Janu-
ary 2003, from Macon and Hannibal elevators, 
two northeast Missouri markets, and from St. 
Louis and Kansas City elevators, two primary 
markets outside of the region, to assess if the ob-
served structural changes affect price integration. 
Price data were obtained from DTN (DTN 2001). 
Pre- and post-structural change event summary 
statistics are reported in Table 1. While average 
prices decreased in each market, the absolute 
value of price differences grew in the soybean 
market and shrank in the corn market following 
the respective structural changes. Sticky prices 
are assumed for this study, meaning that we did 
not adjust for transportation costs. 
integration. The decay of spatial relationships 
over space suggests that more distant markets, 
which are linked indirectly by the markets be-
tween them, may be used as benchmarks in as-
sessing the implications of a structural change 
event (Goodwin and Schroeder 1991). 
  Error correction VAR models, incorporating a 
structural change dummy interacted with the speed-
of-adjustment coefficient and a time trend dummy 
interacted with the speed-of-adjustment coeffi-
cient, were estimated to determine whether price 
responsiveness among locations differs before 
and after the identified structural change events. 
Initially a macroeconomic forecasting method 
(Sims 1980), VAR modeling has since found mi-
croeconomic applications (e.g., Goodwin 1992a 
and Goodwin and Piggott 2001). Highly inte-
grated markets should respond to shocks in each 
other by quickly returning to a long-run equilib-
rium (Enders 1995). The error correction VAR 
model is specified as 
All statistical analyses were conducted using 
EViews 4 (EViews Users Reference Manual 
2001). As previously indicated, the time-series 
data used for this study exhibited nonstationarity, 
where t refers to time (t = 1, 2, . . ., T), which for 
this study is days; i and j refer to elevator location 
(i ≠ j); k is the number of lag lengths; and λit is an 
n x 1 vector of normally distributed random er-
rors. The first three terms following the intercept 
term on the right-hand side of equation (4) are the 
speed-of-adjustment measure, an interaction term 
between the speed-of-adjustment measure and 
structural binary variable (structural shiftt  = 1 
following the structural shift, 0 o.w.), and an in-
teraction term between the speed-of-adjustment 
measure and time trend variable (trend after 
structural shiftt = 1, 2, 3 . . . T following the 
structural change event, 0 o.w.). The next two 
terms are lagged price variables following from 
the standard VAR model. A speed-of-adjustment 
coefficient close to one in absolute value indi-
cates fast adjustment to deviations from equilib-
rium, and a value close to zero indicates a slow to 
no adjustment. We expect the absolute value of 
the speed-of-adjustment coefficient to be larger 
for market pairs that include terminal markets 
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which was corrected for by first-differencing the 
data. Pre- and post-structural change Johansen 
unrestricted cointegration rank test statistics (En-
ders 1995) are reported in Table 2. Trace statis-
tics, calculated from characteristic roots (i.e., ei-
genvalues), reject the null hypothesis of no coin-
tegrating vector at the one percent level in each 
case. Hence, all paired corn and soybean markets 
are deemed cointegrated. Thus, between each set 
of locations a long-run price relationship exists 
before and after the respective structural change 
events. The presence of a cointegrating relation-
ship between each paired price series justifies the 
error correction VAR model, as opposed to the 
standard VAR model (Enders 1995). The lag 
length of the VAR model was determined by 
minimizing the Akaike Information Criteria 
(Greene 2003). 
  To conserve space, only speed-of-adjustment 
coefficients are presented in Table 3. (Full results 
of the VAR analysis are available from the au-
thors upon request.) Although the flow of com-
modities is likely unidirectional, results are re-
ported for both directions of price integration. 
The speed-of-adjustment coefficient over all ob-
servations is statistically significant at the 5 per-
cent level (column one of Table 3). As expected, 
the speed-of-adjustment coefficient is generally 
greater for relationships where one market is a 
terminal market. The distance decay impact does 
not seem to be as pronounced for firms pricing 
homogeneous goods (e.g., corn and soybeans) as 
for firms pricing product-differentiated goods 
(i.e., more substitutable goods have greater infor-
mation flows). The absolute value of the speed-of-
adjustment coefficient is, in general, smaller than 
that found for other industries (e.g., Schroeder 
[1997] finds the speed-of-adjustment coefficient 
to vary between 0.15 and 0.45 for beef-packing 
firms). However, in most cases full return to equi-
librium occurs within one week, which is similar 
to the findings by Goodwin and Piggott (2001) 
for North Carolina corn and soybean markets. 
  The second column of Table 3 is the immediate 
change in the size of the speed-of-adjustment 
coefficient following the structural change event. 
The fourth column of Table 3 is the trend of the 
speed-of-adjustment coefficient following the 
structural change event. Columns three and five 
indicate the composite impact immediately fol-
lowing the structural change and at the end of the 
study period, respectively. In addition to statisti-
cal significance, one should consider the eco-
nomic significance of changes in coefficient val-
ues, as the implications of changes in the absolute 
level of price integration are not well understood. 
Beyond statistical significance, we deem speed-
of-adjustment coefficients greater than 0.10 in 
absolute value and changes of 20 percent or more 
in coefficient values between columns one and 
three, one and five, or three and five to be eco-
nomically significant. Consider the Hannibal → 
Kansas City model in the elevator consolidation 
case. The absolute value of the speed-of-adjust-
ment coefficient -0.2096 (column one) indicates 
that nearly 21 percent of the price adjustment in 
Hannibal is realized in Kansas City within one 
day. Immediately after the merger (column three), 
27 percent of the price adjustment occurs within 
one day, which is a 31 percent increase. By the 
end of the study period, 14 percent of the price 
adjustment occurs within one day, which is much 
slower than that reported in column one or col-
umn three. 
  The immediate post-merger impact (column 
two) is an economically significant increase in the 
level of across-location price integration in four 
of the five scenarios meeting our criteria. Fol-
lowing the immediate impact, economically sig-
nificant erosion in the level of integration persists 
through the end of the study period. While 
Bedrossian and Moschos (1988) found the short-
run speed-of-adjustment to be negatively related 
to increased industry concentration, we find that a 
longer time period is required before realizing a 
decrease in price integration from a merger in the 
grain/oilseed industry. 
  An initial reduction in transaction costs, due to 
intra-firm information exchange, may explain the 
merger’s immediate positive impact on market 
integration, but why would the intra-firm level of 
market integration erode over time? Perhaps the 
exercise of market power is learned over time.
8 
Quincy Soybean may have been small enough for 
its acquisition by ADM to not alarm government 
antitrust agencies, unlike mergers concerning the 
acquisition of more prominent firms, in which 
firms were required to sell off assets to ensure   
 
8 Alternative explanations seem improbable, as technological ad-
vancements decrease barriers to information transmission, and there is 
no reason to suspect market infrastructure to decrease in such a devel-
oped market. 
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Table 2. Summary of Johansen Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test Statistics of Reported 
Elevator Prices (constant, no trend) 
  January 1, 1996, to December 31, 1997    January 1, 1998, to January 30, 2003 
Elevator consolidation (soybean markets)  Eigenvalue  Trace statistic    Eigenvalue  Trace statistic 
Hannibal ↔ Kansas City  0.063**  36.919    0.045**  62.490 
Hannibal ↔ St. Louis  0.055**  31.987    0.039**  52.923 
Hannibal ↔ Macon  0.042**  25.834    0.053**  73.288 
          
  January 1, 1996, to April 28, 2000    May 1, 2000, to January 30, 2003 
Ethanol plant operation (corn markets)  Eigenvalue  Trace statistic    Eigenvalue  Trace statistic 
Macon ↔ Kansas City  0.052**  62.062    0.103**  77.651 
Macon ↔ St. Louis  0.044**  51.917    0.065**  48.541 
Macon ↔ Hannibal  0.064**  76.738    0.090**  68.180 
Note: ** denotes rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegrating vector at the one percent level. Lag-length is set to 22. 
Number of observations is 545 (1,130) prior to and 1,304 (719) after the merger (new value-added business) structural change. 
The trace test statistic one percent critical value is 6.65. 
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Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ** denotes statistical significance at 5 percent level. Lag-length is set to 22 in vector 
autoregression estimator. Number of observations is 1,849. 
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competitiveness.
9 While the abuse of market power 
is cause for concern, no negative connotation is 
attached to market power in and of itself, as the 
downward slope of a demand curve reflects its 
existence (Frank and Bernanke 2001). Certain 
advantages (e.g., scale, scope, etc.) are also asso-
ciated with consolidation. Thus, previously com-
peting facilities may not compete for the same 
market share post-merger, as the acquiring firm 
may capitalize on these advantages by reallocat-
ing facilities to other commodities or for other 
purposes. Such activity reflects rational behavior 
by the acquiring firm and, at the same time, may 
provide opportunity for a new entrant. 
  For the case of the new value-added business, 
the immediate impact of the three relationships 
fitting our criteria of economic significance is a 
decrease in the level of price integration. Of 
these, one can easily argue that only the Kansas 
City  → Macon relationship makes economic 
sense, due to the flow of grain and Kansas City’s 
importance as a terminal market. One may pos-
tulate that a segregated market initially arose 
around the ethanol plant, as the plant changed 
seasonal demand, i.e., convenience yield. How-
ever, the absolute value of the speed-of-adjust-
ment coefficient increases by the end of the period 
of study, as the trend effect generally offsets the 
initial impact. Thus, there may have been a 
learning period in spatially dispersed markets 
following the structural change. In general, we 
conclude no significant change in the level of 
local price integration prior to and following the 




The purpose of this research was to analyze how 
the degree of price integration within soybean and 
corn markets responds to the presence of struc-
tural change in the respective markets. The 1998 
merger of ADM and Quincy Soybean and the 
2000 opening of the NEMO ethanol plant in 
northeast Missouri were the particular cases 
studied. Given the degree of substitutability be-
tween corn and soybeans in livestock rations and 
their use in crop rotations, the possibility of con-
 
9 In the 1998 merger of Cargill, Inc., and Continental Grains, the 
Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice required the firms 
to divest ten elevators in seven states (MacDonald 1999). 
tamination in a study such as ours is indeed a 
legitimate initial concern. We would expect the 
potential for such contamination to be indicated 
by changes in the acres planted to each crop, as 
rational farmers would attempt to react to chang-
ing market conditions. Upon examination of the 
acres planted to each crop in the appropriately 
selected northeast Missouri counties correspond-
ing to this study, we find minimal changes over 
the analyzed time period. The percentage of acres 
planted to corn prior to and following the ethanol 
plant structural change increased from 29.80 per-
cent to 29.90 percent in the 7-county area (3-year 
average). Soybean planted acres went from 66.02 
percent prior to the merger to 65.18 percent after. 
We suggest that these small changes are likely 
due to government programs and genetics. Hence, 
we believe the potential for contamination in this 
study to be low. 
  After correcting for nonstationarity, tests of 
cointegration and VAR analysis were employed 
to investigate whether changes in market integra-
tion corresponded to the two observed structural 
change events. We find evidence that the impact 
of localized structural change, in the form of a 
new value-added business, is less than that previ-
ously reported for industry-wide structural 
change. Whereas for the case of a grain/oilseed 
merger, we find that the level of price integration 
erodes over time. 
  Our results yield two important findings. First, 
it appears that a new business does not signifi-
cantly impact spatial price linkages over a larger 
geographic area, particularly for a substantially 
sized new business. Second, while there is ini-
tially a significant gain in price integration due to 
the merger, long-term effects suggest a loss of 
price integration. While others (e.g., Bedrossian 
and Moschos 1988, Dixon 1983, and Scherer 
1980) have found a reduction in the size of the 
speed-of-adjustment coefficient due to mergers, 
we find that the speed-of-adjustment size erodes 
over time. Other studies have not analyzed this 
specific issue. 
  The merger case suggests caution for future 
price analyses performed over periods that 
comprise structural change events. In particular, 
researchers should pay close attention to the time 
lag of the impact following a merger. Model re-
specification may be necessary for the situation 
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where a significant merger has occurred, but 
model re-specification is less likely needed for 
the case of a new business venture entering the 
market. The limitation of this study is that it deals 
only with price integration among markets and, 
hence, does not provide insight into changes in 
price levels that may or may not have occurred. 
Future research could investigate the seasonality 
of price integration, and to what extent the level 
of price integration differs between homogeneous 
and heterogeneous goods. 
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